Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · SwissBorg
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 52 → 47 (-5)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425424108
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-09T23:06:01.952Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5nHFAPE4Gm9Tc7qRbGDCzsfsYpuaxA2LVHZknSthu9Lc
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1286 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-09T23:06:01.736Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"524894ae-ff61-4c27-9e9e-0f8c8069ce3e","new_score":47,"page_slug":"swissborg","prev_score":52,"reason":"11 of 15 claims were confirmed by independent sources including Tier 1 outlets (The Record, Protos, AMF registry, Kiln's own post-mortem). The single disputed finding (claim_findings[9]) is a secondary timeline date error: the Proof of Liabilities system is listed as launched June 2024 when multiple Tier 1 sources confirm it launched in April/May 2023 — a 13-month discrepancy likely caused by confusing an audit snapshot identifier with the feature launch date. Two additional claims are partially supported due to minor date imprecisions on regulatory registrations (claim_findings[8] and claim_findings[14]). No link rot was detected and core allegations about the September 2025 exploit, loss amount, attack vector, and reimbursement pledge are all well-sourced. Two high-priority coverage gaps — reimbursement completion status and on-chain fund recovery outcome — should be addressed before the page is considered fully current.","score_delta":-5,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}