Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Starknet
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 45 → 45 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 426514648
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-14T23:16:07.314Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- FEFPExfDG6mW1mJXjENvay5VLpNBw7jnYFLMcGGs6ULZ
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1681 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-14T23:16:07.256Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"60467ada-cfc0-4f9d-9b8c-1b4c334089c8","new_score":45,"page_slug":"starknet","prev_score":45,"reason":"Blue-chip calibration review (Prompt A). Verdict: over-penalized. Page content is treated as accurate; the trust_score band is miscalibrated. Starknet is a well-documented, VC-backed Layer 2 ZK-rollup with verified institutional investors, credentialed MIT/Technion founders, and a consistent multi-year technical track record. None of the incidents described on the page constitute entity-level fraud: the largest loss event (zkLend, $9.57M) was a third-party DeFi protocol exploit with a bug in zkLend's own accumulator logic, not in Starknet's infrastructure; the airdrop controversy and token unlock dispute reflect governance friction but involved no user fund loss; and the sequencer centralization issue is now partially resolved (Stage 1 decentralization confirmed May 2025). A WARNING band (20-49) by AVOID.NET's post-policy semantics is reserved for entities with elevated fraud/loss risk or unresolved severe incidents — none of those apply here. The appropriate band is CAUTIONARY (50-69): legitimate with material caveats, which include the token unlock opacity, the third-party ecosystem exploit, significant revenue decline (99% from peak), network outages in 2025-2026, and ongoing sequencer decentralization work. A score of 62 reflects these real concerns without conflating ecosystem incidents with entity-level fraud.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}