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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
00 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443519679
Off-chain at
2026-08-26T07:07:33.463Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
EYuLxEbrSUoEr5zF33G3aj9agavU2LnGZuLrWPQYPzG1
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1629 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T07:07:33.126Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"83dae395-6719-4cb4-b5fc-4a2b875617e0","new_score":0,"page_slug":"q2-2026-bridge-exploit-wave","prev_score":0,"reason":"An independent fact-check confirmed the large majority of this page's incident-level facts -- amounts, dates, and attack mechanisms for the Drift, KelpDAO, Hyperbridge, THORChain, Verus, Syscoin, and Taiko exploits -- against primary incident reports and multiple independent outlets (26 of 37 claims fully confirmed, disputed share 5/37 = 13.5%). The review did find a real error in how the page frames its aggregate bridge-loss statistics: the claim that Drift and KelpDAO together made up 'over 76% of bridge-related losses' (claim_findings[4]) mixes up two different denominators and appears to include Drift, which the cited sources classify outside the bridge-exploit category, and a recurring '$340 million cumulative bridge losses' figure used in the summary and Syscoin sections (claim_findings[0], claim_findings[30]) does not match the sum of the page's own six itemized incidents (~$328.5M) and conflates a Q2-specific total with a separate full-year statistic. These are framing and arithmetic errors in the page's own self-generated statistics rather than misstatements about what happened in each individual incident, so the page needs correction of its aggregate figures rather than removal or a credibility downgrade of its underlying reporting.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}