Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Q2 2026 Bridge Exploit Wave
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-12)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443519679
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T07:07:33.463Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- EYuLxEbrSUoEr5zF33G3aj9agavU2LnGZuLrWPQYPzG1
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1629 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T07:07:33.126Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"83dae395-6719-4cb4-b5fc-4a2b875617e0","new_score":0,"page_slug":"q2-2026-bridge-exploit-wave","prev_score":0,"reason":"An independent fact-check confirmed the large majority of this page's incident-level facts -- amounts, dates, and attack mechanisms for the Drift, KelpDAO, Hyperbridge, THORChain, Verus, Syscoin, and Taiko exploits -- against primary incident reports and multiple independent outlets (26 of 37 claims fully confirmed, disputed share 5/37 = 13.5%). The review did find a real error in how the page frames its aggregate bridge-loss statistics: the claim that Drift and KelpDAO together made up 'over 76% of bridge-related losses' (claim_findings[4]) mixes up two different denominators and appears to include Drift, which the cited sources classify outside the bridge-exploit category, and a recurring '$340 million cumulative bridge losses' figure used in the summary and Syscoin sections (claim_findings[0], claim_findings[30]) does not match the sum of the page's own six itemized incidents (~$328.5M) and conflates a Q2-specific total with a separate full-year statistic. These are framing and arithmetic errors in the page's own self-generated statistics rather than misstatements about what happened in each individual incident, so the page needs correction of its aggregate figures rather than removal or a credibility downgrade of its underlying reporting.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}