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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
3 → 0 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443513548
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T10:19:10.929Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
4MLkWghUQCXYdFubg6vRg7qM1NWm8Vhz57UmWgUbm42Z
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2109 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T10:19:10.351Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"491937e2-0e11-4c61-ac86-db98727d3bab","new_score":0,"page_slug":"crypto-com-phishing-campaign-email-domain-abuse-august-2026","prev_score":3,"reason":"The page's central allegation -- that Crypto.com's SendGrid marketing infrastructure and branded tracking domain (url1137.crypto.com) were abused to send authenticated phishing emails -- is confirmed and, unlike most of the page's incident-specific detail, independently corroborated by a third-party domain scan rather than resting solely on a single blog post (claim_findings[0], [6]). Set against that, the review disputes an industry-statistics claim where the page's own cited sources contradict it: the page states average scam payments grew 'more than 600%,' while both Chainalysis and CryptoDailyUK, cited by the page itself, put the figure at 253% (claim_findings[17]). The review also finds a one-year date error in a cited precedent, misdating the CoinTracking SendGrid incident to November 2024 instead of November 2025, repeated in both the narrative and the timeline (claim_findings[22], [27]). Two high-priority coverage gaps further weigh on this outcome: nearly every incident-specific detail about the Crypto.com attack -- the compromise, the attack chain, the evasion artifacts, and the sole $50,000 loss figure -- traces back to one anonymous Substack post amplified by one aggregator citing a single Reddit post, with no mainstream outlet or named security vendor corroborating it, and the loss figure has no on-chain trace. The page does consistently and correctly frame Crypto.com as the victim of third-party infrastructure abuse rather than as a breached party, which keeps this from being a fairness or defamation problem, but that correct framing is the baseline expectation for the page rather than a factor that offsets the sourcing thinness and the two identified accuracy errors.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}