Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · DCENT Wallet
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 50 → 50 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462186752
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T19:20:14.300Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T19:20:20.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T19:20:20.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- BbR4sYuDXX2mzBkNUxKL9Gu6Etnyee1PT12q49ij68Fs
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2159 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"f01ddc0e340e1036c10d7c7f76d5af25","band_override":null,"blocked_count":2,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:20:13.969Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"07bf35c4-e22a-41d5-9e6e-dc6f4c437029","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":50,"page_slug":"dcent-wallet","prev_score":50,"reason":"The page's core facts hold: the September 16, 2026 disclosure and the hardware-wallet statements are confirmed (claim_findings[0], [5]). The two claims that the incident has no disclosed scope and that no third-party on-chain analysis exists are stale (claim_findings[1], [2]). Reporting as of September 23, 2026 shows funds were drained, versions before 8.1.0 are in scope, and XRPL.to and XRPL Intel have published analyses, so the page understates an exploit that has happened (subject_status, omission_findings[0] to [2]). The Atomic Wallet and BitKeep figures also do not match the cited Halborn pages (claim_findings[3], [4]). Two company-background claims could not be checked because the sources blocked the reviewer, which is a coverage limit and not a defect of the page. The penalty stays moderate because the reviewer's confidence is 0.6 and the original claims were accurate when written.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":7,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"approve","reason":"By claim percentage alone the page sits in the minor band (2 stale of 7 countable findings, about 29%; two source_blocked findings excluded). However, omission_findings[1] is critical and omission_findings[0] and [2] are material, and subject_status.contradicts_page is true: the page says no loss, scope or on-chain analysis exists, while later reporting shows funds drained (about 2.0M XRP from 1,552 wallets) and affected versions below 8.1.0. This is escalated to the significant band."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}