Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457578099
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T08:54:42.458Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T08:55:02.459Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- D2HqsAgGw7zpfB2unX1Ji98PTV7pcp6YJEz8Pf34vJU9
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1961 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"22f79517183317e87d58945f041702b1","decided_at":"2026-10-16T08:54:42.243Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.1923,"findings_hash":"BuECjidU9aUT7wna4KEiWvRxkadkWMnv6dRQpdHk6MKW","investigation_id":"d96ffb36-224d-4516-b961-712c58daad2c","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"page_content_hash":"cd232788f113910cfed052a1a32f7f22600dd2953afdb2c5174665112d2b2fee","page_slug":"verus-ethereum-bridge-second-exploit-july-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a July 23, 2026 repeat exploit of the Verus-Ethereum bridge for ~$7.54M via the same unpatched checkCCEValues/submitImports flaw that caused the May 18 $11.58M exploit, laundered through Tornado Cash — is well corroborated by The Block, CryptoTimes, Rekt News, Halborn, and CoinDesk, including the specific transaction hash, wallet addresses, and combined $19.1M/$31.5M/$35M loss figures. The most significant problem is a factual overstatement repeated in two places: the page says the full 4,052.4 ETH recovered from the May attacker was redeposited into the bridge on July 8, when Rekt News's more granular on-chain reporting puts the actual redeposit at only ~1,192 ETH, with recovered tBTC/USDC held back — this matters because it is central to the page's governance-failure argument. A handful of specific figures (the TVL decline from $100M to $9M, the Circle/Tether monitoring request, the '$750 million' 2026 DeFi exploit wave attributed to CoinDesk, and the 'largest two-incident cumulative loss' superlative) could not be verified in any cited or independently found source. Two sourcing mechanics issues were also found: a broken bitcoinfoundation.org URL (missing a path segment, used twice) and a MoneyCheck archive_url that points to an unrelated article about a different story entirely.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}