Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Bond Protocol
- Sequence
- #6
- Score
- 54 → 54 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457970074
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-17T08:27:17.134Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-17T08:27:44.870Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- J8oGiaEj8diAPnDpf4Qmo81ErTu9LBv9XYZX65g9TLtJ
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2123 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"6662c04726b76c597b5059c6aeb0e8af","decided_at":"2026-10-17T08:27:16.887Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.4286,"findings_hash":"4XMkJZdwoXf39Nie85wzpdwodG58fY4g5SH23BbimBUt","investigation_id":"d9137293-15db-46cf-b00d-94ca66903d90","mode":"findings_only","new_score":54,"page_content_hash":"c4e8c18137f0ffe80fc0ccdd8dfc73c7f76b3c914a4fb2d137ce32e37e447d46","page_slug":"bond-protocol","prev_score":54,"reason":"The page's core narrative — permissionless bonding infrastructure spun out of OlympusDAO, a well-documented October 2022 exploit that was fully reimbursed within hours, a credible $2.5M seed round, and a plausible recent slowdown — is well supported by independent reporting (The Block, Decrypt, Halborn, BeInCrypto) and by direct inspection of the cited GitHub organization. The most substantive problem is the audit narrative: the page twice asserts that all three auditors, including Zellic, reviewed the code 'prior to launch'/'prior to the incident,' but Zellic's own published report documents an engagement of October 26–November 2, 2022, which postdates both the October 3 launch and the October 21 exploit — it was a post-incident review, not a pre-incident one. The July 15, 2022 timeline date for Bond Protocol's introduction is also in tension with an independent read of the cited Medium post (which points to July 19), though a different cited source (IQ.wiki) supports July 15, so this is left as unverifiable. Several Q1 2023 metrics (the $22.9M TBV figure, 147% growth, and specific bonding counts) and the Tracxn single-employee claim could not be checked because the primary sources returned HTTP 403 to automated fetches. The most significant gap is the omission of the team's own framing of Bond Protocol's decline: an OlympusDAO RFC describes a direct successor, Axis, citing declining bond-issuer traction, which would meaningfully sharpen the page's vague 'limited recent public disclosures' framing.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}