Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Verus Ethereum Bridge Second Exploit (July 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 8 → 0 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443506528
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-10T14:49:19.345Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3LKhA6HCCBG99uJEPwad1sQ8vaz1uge2un5ATvKteZUR
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1664 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-10T14:49:19.125Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"d96ffb36-224d-4516-b961-712c58daad2c","new_score":0,"page_slug":"verus-ethereum-bridge-second-exploit-july-2026","prev_score":8,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a second Verus-Ethereum Bridge exploit on July 23, 2026 reusing an unpatched May 18, 2026 vulnerability, following a July 8 redeposit of recovered funds — held up under review, with 14 of 20 claims fully confirmed against Tier 1/2 sources including specific on-chain identifiers (claim_findings[10]) and Blockaid's own technical disclosures (claim_findings[1], [5], [8]). The issues found are peripheral rather than central: a one-day timeline misdate for the May detection event (claim_findings[20], contradicts the page's own summary text), an editorial 'governance failure' framing attributed to unnamed analysts that isn't directly sourced (claim_findings[13]), and a handful of unverifiable but plausible secondary claims — an exact attack timestamp, an aggregate industry loss figure attribution, a superlative ranking claim, and a claim about exchanges being asked to monitor wallets (claim_findings[6], [16], [18], [21]). No claims were found to be disputed on the substance of the exploit, the amounts, or the mechanism, and no citations showed link rot or staleness. A high-priority coverage gap notes the page has not been checked for any August 2026 follow-up statement or patch from VerusCoin, which affects currency rather than accuracy.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}