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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Ekubo Protocol
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#7
Score
61 → 51 (-10)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
461981605
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T07:12:52.898Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T07:13:14.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T07:13:14.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
8Lhsd5hci5MWeyfZMtGL8wEfJpo7pMqF5DgJsP9JyyiT
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1923 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"2d1af4ad7092bc68e9f547a28c465d14","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T07:12:52.281Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3,"investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":51,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":61,"reason":"Of 10 checkable claims (one blocked-source claim excluded), 3 were unverifiable, giving 30% disputed-or-unverifiable. The core exploit account (about $1.4M WBTC, Tornado Cash, Starknet unaffected) is confirmed (claim_findings[0], [1]). However, the claim that the team 'funded an on-chain recovery fund' is not supported by any cited source and appears to be a proposed, capped reimbursement plan (claim_findings[2], [3]). The '39/40 with zero disclosure gaps' claim is contradicted by the newer October 2026 Blockworks filing, which lists many gaps (claim_findings[4], [5]), and the page omits that claims remain open and approvals remain at risk (omission_findings[0], [1]).","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-10,"score_limit":{"applied":-10,"limited":true,"proposed":-18,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"scored_claims":10,"sequence_num":7,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"The review reports two material omissions (open reimbursement claims, partial WBTC coverage and unrevoked approvals still at risk; the Oct 2026 Blockworks disclosure gaps). The page also states the opposite of the live Blockworks filing (zero gaps) and overstates the recovery effort. The percentage sits at the 30% boundary, so the significant band applies."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}