Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Ekubo Protocol
- Sequence
- #7
- Score
- 61 → 51 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 461981605
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T07:12:52.898Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T07:13:14.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T07:13:14.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 8Lhsd5hci5MWeyfZMtGL8wEfJpo7pMqF5DgJsP9JyyiT
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1923 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"2d1af4ad7092bc68e9f547a28c465d14","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T07:12:52.281Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3,"investigation_id":"766c540c-a4ce-4c02-afb8-366643c4aaf1","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":51,"page_slug":"ekubo-protocol","prev_score":61,"reason":"Of 10 checkable claims (one blocked-source claim excluded), 3 were unverifiable, giving 30% disputed-or-unverifiable. The core exploit account (about $1.4M WBTC, Tornado Cash, Starknet unaffected) is confirmed (claim_findings[0], [1]). However, the claim that the team 'funded an on-chain recovery fund' is not supported by any cited source and appears to be a proposed, capped reimbursement plan (claim_findings[2], [3]). The '39/40 with zero disclosure gaps' claim is contradicted by the newer October 2026 Blockworks filing, which lists many gaps (claim_findings[4], [5]), and the page omits that claims remain open and approvals remain at risk (omission_findings[0], [1]).","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-10,"score_limit":{"applied":-10,"limited":true,"proposed":-18,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"scored_claims":10,"sequence_num":7,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"The review reports two material omissions (open reimbursement claims, partial WBTC coverage and unrevoked approvals still at risk; the Oct 2026 Blockworks disclosure gaps). The page also states the opposite of the live Blockworks filing (zero gaps) and overstates the recovery effort. The percentage sits at the 30% boundary, so the significant band applies."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}