Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Verus Protocol (VRSC)
- Sequence
- #6
- Score
- 25 → 25 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457661389
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T13:53:57.607Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T13:54:19.856Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Cnx8PmA2vnQiGxrXUEmmDGDzm8R6Kub8JxdgYZiRMCw4
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2128 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"2c3b5600d021f1422d64c3fee941f462","decided_at":"2026-10-16T13:53:57.328Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.3548,"findings_hash":"9CofQ4t35omvMMCy7x5oEGrKjhtFxsikaEomKKKrmz2U","investigation_id":"8b05afa2-b3b1-4812-a3c2-2b69513839e8","mode":"findings_only","new_score":25,"page_content_hash":"ae8e727c9defcb2df8e56104f2f99f02e35a7b26b252c02b79c3dba6c61e4461","page_slug":"verus-protocol-vrsc","prev_score":25,"reason":"The page's core narrative -- two Verus-Ethereum Bridge exploits in 2026 sharing a missing economic-validation root cause, the May bounty negotiation, and the July repeat attack -- is well supported by primary technical writeups (Merkle Science, Halborn, Rekt) and multiple news outlets, nearly all of which were fetched directly and corroborate the page's figures, dates, and wallet addresses closely. The most significant problem is a repeated, cross-location overstatement (summary, two sections, one timeline entry) that 'no confirmed patch' existed before the July 8 reopening: Verus in fact publicly released and documented a bridge-restoration patch (v1.2.17, v1.2.17-1) before reopening, which simply proved insufficient against a related but distinct validation gap -- a materially different claim from 'no patch was disclosed.' The TVL section cites a source (CoinCentral) that does not contain the figures attributed to it, and independent reporting (Rekt/DeFiLlama) gives a somewhat different start-of-2025 TVL figure. The page also contains an internal math error (claiming $19.12M in losses 'exceeds' a stated $22M lower-end market-cap estimate, when it does not) and double-counts the April 2026 Kelp DAO rsETH hack as two separate incidents. Minor, lower-stakes issues include an unverifiable 41%-of-DeFi-losses statistic, an unverifiable May 2023 PBaaS deployment date (source blocked automated fetch), and a milestones-page citation that doesn't actually contain the specific day (May 21) attributed to it.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}