Verify a decision

{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T17:07:40.337Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"acbf7d40-7b57-4717-869d-bcf63a1d1f69","new_score":26,"page_slug":"taiko","prev_score":38,"reason":"Independent fact-checking confirmed the page's core technical description (Ethereum-equivalent Type 1 zkEVM, based contestable rollup, SGX+ZK multi-proof design) and the mechanics of the June 2026 bridge exploit, but found two disputed items and one materially outdated section. The page credits 'BlockSec' with identifying the exploit's root cause, but the page's own cited sources (The Defiant, CryptoTimes, plus Etherscan's exploiter tag) instead credit Blockaid, PeckShield, and Quill Audits (claim_findings[3]) — a named-firm attribution error. A timeline entry dates an SP1/Plonky3 vulnerability disclosure to 2025-01-01, a placeholder day, when the sourced disclosure is January 27, 2025 (claim_findings[14]). Separately, the Incident Response section stops at a June 25, 2026 update and omits that the bridge fully reopened on July 2, 2026 with affected users reportedly made whole, leaving readers with the impression the incident is still unresolved nearly two months after it was closed (claim_findings[8], coverage_gaps[0], high priority). Four additional findings on specific L2BEAT parameters (permissionless delay periods, TVS concentration, exit-window absence) were marked unverifiable solely because the reviewer's tool repeatedly failed to load l2beat.com, not because any figure was shown to be wrong (claim_findings[10], [11], [12], [15]); these are treated as open questions rather than confirmed errors and are weighted lightly. Counting disputed and unverifiable claims together yields roughly 29% of all claims checked, which sits just below the 30% threshold that would place the page under investigation, so the page is being sent back for correction rather than flagged or delisted.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}