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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
0 → 0 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443514940
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T13:59:41.724Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
6w2oXEgS3foDh5YLSQszQUwZZp6H4LSqeqfQVVtBdsWp
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1934 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T13:59:41.071Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"fee02041-4d9a-4f8c-873d-070c0eb8c403","new_score":0,"page_slug":"unidentified-crypto-whale-25-6m-repeated-phishing-drain","prev_score":0,"reason":"Fact-checking confirmed most of this page: the core incident (date, dollar amount, mechanism), the full stolen-asset breakdown, the 2023 prior incident and its figures, the 90% fund-return history, and the broader 2026 crypto-loss statistics all held up against independently fetched sources (claim_findings[0,2,3,4,6,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,22,23,24,25]). Two problems stood out. First, the page identifies address 0x8fEB...F95Ae as the attacker's, but a directly fetched CryptoRank article describes that same address as the victim's own targeted wallet -- a genuine, unresolved contradiction between sources on who the attacker actually is (claim_findings[5]). Second, the page credits AMBCrypto with a set of Blockaid statistics ($1.1B / 212 incidents / $790M) that AMBCrypto's actual article does not contain; the figures themselves are accurate and correctly cited to a different source elsewhere on the same page, making this a misattributed citation rather than a fabricated number (claim_findings[9]). Two additional claims -- the carried-forward victim wallet prefix and an 'largest incident of the month' superlative -- could not be verified either way (claim_findings[1,8]). Together these push disputed_pct to about 15%, within the minor-issues band. Separately, the reviewer found this page duplicates another AVOID.NET entry describing the identical incident; that is a platform indexing problem, not a defect in this page's content, so it is noted but not scored here to avoid double-penalizing one incident twice.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}