Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · United Stables (U)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 48 → 33 (-15)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443525356
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T10:41:39.383Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 9WQYPut2obujkAPBsVAkNe4tvbmgqsy3XuwWVaEK8YSa
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2044 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T10:41:38.833Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"eb936eda-2c70-449f-8e13-283e5982728e","new_score":33,"page_slug":"united-stables-u","prev_score":48,"reason":"Independent verification confirmed most of the page's claims (22 of 28), including the entity structure, licensing self-disclosures, most exchange listings, the Chainlink partnership, and both documented peg-pressure events, so this is not a page that broadly falls apart. But the single most important fact for a stablecoin -- what backs the token -- is compromised: claim_findings[12] states a precise reserve figure for June 18, 2026 that its own cited article directly contradicts, since that article explicitly says no public reserve data is known. That is compounded by two partially-supported findings on the same theme: claim_findings[16] shows the page's own cited CoinGecko data records a 3.18% peg deviation shortly after launch that the page omits while claiming a tight 0.05% band, and claim_findings[10] shows the page names specific reserve assets with more certainty than the actual Terms and Conditions, which leaves composition to the issuer's sole discretion. A separate disputed listing claim, claim_findings[21] (Coinbase), also could not be corroborated and appears likely wrong. The review's own coverage_gaps[0], rated high priority, calls for independent on-chain Proof-of-Reserve verification for exactly this reason. Raw disputed_pct (7.1%) sits in the approve range, but the concentration of defects around the page's central solvency claim, plus the high-priority gap tied to it, is enough to require revision rather than a clean pass; it does not, however, rise to the volume or reviewer-confidence level needed for a harsher outcome, given the reviewer's moderate-to-good confidence (0.72) and the fact that most claims held up under direct source checks.","score_delta":-15,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}