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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#1
Score
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
420848179
Off-chain at
2026-05-19T21:12:25.816Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
77tcvKWd2r6gMByqisRDwNXVvcwkaVq7x78KFaaMFyoE
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (5809 chars)
{"actor":"system:backfill","investigation_id":"ebd43551-764e-4f75-ab7d-83aba2dc9d0e","kind":"publish","page_slug":"team-finance","published_at":"2026-05-19T21:12:25.752Z","sequence_num":1,"snapshot":{"content_type":"investigation","entity_name":"Team Finance","sections":[{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220429005583/en/TrustSwaps-Team.Finance-Continues-to-Be-the-Industry-Leader-in-Cryptocurrency-Token-Locks-and-Management"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://defillama.com/protocol/team-finance"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.crunchbase.com/person/jeff-kirdeikis"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://medium.com/haechi-audit/team-finance-incident-analysis-537656284ed0"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-team-finance-hack-october-2022"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://hacken.io/insights/why-team-finance-was-exploited-for-14-5-million-despite-its-audit/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.theblock.co/post/180369/hacker-uses-2700-to-drain-15-8-million-from-team-finance"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://blockworks.co/news/defi-platform-exploited-for-14-5m-despite-security-audits"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/analysis-review-of-team-finance-exploit-f439c2f63e2"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://medium.com/haechi-audit/team-finance-incident-analysis-537656284ed0"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2fe530c047f2d85298b07d9333c05737f1435fb"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2022/10/31/attacker-behind-145m-team-finance-exploit-returns-7m"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://cointelegraph.com/news/team-finance-hacker-returns-7m-to-associated-projects-after-exploit"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://beincrypto.com/another-white-hat-hacker-returns-funds-from-platform-exploit/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://slowmist.medium.com/analysis-review-of-team-finance-exploit-f439c2f63e2"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.cryptopolitan.com/team-finance-exploited-for-15-million/"}]},{"content":"","heading":"","severity":"medium","sources":[{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://hacken.io/insights/why-team-finance-was-exploited-for-14-5-million-despite-its-audit/"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-team-finance-hack-october-2022"},{"credibility":3,"name":"","type":"other","url":"https://immunebytes.com/blog/team-finance-exploit-oct-27-2022-detailed-analysis/"}]}],"sources_used":[],"summary":"Team Finance is a DeFi token-locking and vesting platform operated by TrustSwap Inc. that suffered a critical $14.5 million exploit on October 27, 2022, when an attacker abused a validation flaw in its Uniswap V2-to-V3 migration function. The attacker ultimately returned approximately $7 million, retaining roughly 10% as a self-declared bug bounty; Team Finance subsequently switched auditors to CertiK and reported full user reimbursement by June 2023.","timeline":[{"date":"2020-01-01","event":"Team Finance founded as part of TrustSwap Inc., offering token locking and vesting smart contracts for DeFi projects.","source":""},{"date":"2022-01-19","event":"Hacken conducts smart contract audit of Team Finance's LockToken.sol and related contracts; migrate() function not yet in scope as it had not been added to the codebase.","source":""},{"date":"2022-04-29","event":"TrustSwap publishes press release stating Team Finance has secured over $6.5 billion in total value and serves more than 21,000 projects.","source":""},{"date":"2022-08-01","event":"Zokyo conducts audit of Team Finance contracts including the migrate() function, flagging two critical vulnerabilities related to arbitrary token address use and reentrancy. Team Finance dismisses findings as 'intended logic.'","source":""},{"date":"2022-10-27","event":"Exploit executed: attacker drains approximately $14.5–15.8 million from four LP pools (FEG, CAW, TSUKA, KNDX) locked on Team Finance via a manipulated Uniswap V2-to-V3 migration call. Team Finance immediately pauses all protocol activity.","source":""},{"date":"2022-10-28","event":"Team Finance publicly appeals to the attacker to return funds in exchange for a bounty. SlowMist, KALOS Security, and other firms publish on-chain analysis of the exploit.","source":""},{"date":"2022-10-29","event":"Attacker begins returning funds to affected projects via on-chain transactions, identifying themselves as a 'whitehat' hacker in embedded transaction messages.","source":""},{"date":"2022-10-31","event":"Approximately $7 million in tokens returned to the four affected project communities (Kondux, Tsuka, FEG, CAW). Attacker retains roughly 10% as a self-declared bug bounty. CoinDesk and CoinTelegraph report on the partial recovery.","source":""},{"date":"2023-06-01","event":"Team Finance representative states that all affected users have received the vast majority of their funds back. Platform reports CertiK engaged as new auditor and multiple security enhancements implemented.","source":""},{"date":"2023-07-01","event":"Jeff Kirdeikis transitions from CEO to Board Chairman of TrustSwap.","source":""}]},"v":1}