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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
10 → 0 (-12)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443515116
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T14:06:58.632Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
9aj17FQ9ZX4qpBhBmoL5Co2bHiLYL9HHUNpiJhkG2kmj
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2032 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T14:06:58.001Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"06c78961-71f4-45b4-8c5c-095eeb41b058","new_score":0,"page_slug":"ravencoin-consensus-vulnerability-exploit-august-2026","prev_score":10,"reason":"The page's core narrative holds up well: the nHeight/KAWPOW consensus flaw, exploitation beginning at block 4,487,776, the 2Miners emergency patch, the exchange suspensions, and the price decline are all independently corroborated, and the review found no confusion with Ravencoin's separate 2018 or 2020 incidents. However, three problems are serious enough to require revision even though only 1 of 47 claims (about 2%) was directly disputed. First, the page reached a confident 'an attacker exploited' characterization without ever consulting the official Ravencoin GitHub release notes, which describe the initiating party as a self-described security researcher whose exploit was only disclosed after a separate party copied it -- a nuance that bears on attribution and intent and was flagged as a high-priority coverage gap (claim_findings[0], [11], [15]; coverage_gaps[0]). Second, the page attributes a 77% year-over-year price decline to CoinTrust, but the cited CoinTrust article contains no such figure at all -- an unsupported citation, regardless of its small share of total claims (claim_findings[30]). Third, an entire section arguing Ravencoin's core team is 'inactive' is now outdated: the same maintainer shipped an official combined fix crediting the community patch five days after the page's stated investigation date, and the page has not been updated to reflect it (claim_findings[32], [40], [46]; coverage_gaps[1]). Together these point to sourcing and currency problems in a page making pointed attribution and governance claims, warranting a modest score reduction and revision rather than approval as published.","score_delta":-12,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}