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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#5
Score
18 → 18 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
462183056
Off-chain at
2026-10-27T19:06:49.996Z
Anchored at
2026-10-27T19:07:13.000Z
Block time
2026-10-27T19:07:13.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
Gi3riAB7yaSjzcuZWH7qHYJN2cJ6d4TKKvG31HcDAVUZ
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1574 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"4784e0251f32840c4509e4e64af6ff1b","blocked_count":3,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:06:49.839Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.3636,"findings_hash":"CcHEx5Tp9FJ7Ap5QLHm8QdUjLJJDNfcmFJCNLrsWimgG","investigation_id":"4feace03-6746-48e9-a625-9cd1ac6e6351","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":18,"omissions":{"material":0,"total":2},"page_content_hash":"15005964c58dfa2e1ac04f7c38489a3dc530cd256038188543ca0d07dbcc5ca5","page_slug":"summer-finance-summer-fi-lazy-summer-protocol-flash-loan-exploit-and-shutdown","prev_score":18,"reason":"The core incident narrative is corroborated by independent reporting: the July 6 single-transaction exploit, about $6.04M split $5.64M/$0.40M, the incomplete-offboarding root cause, about $22M TVL, the Tornado Cash routing, and the July 15 wind-down with August 31 interface closure. One factual error was found, the Series A date (August 2023 on the page, April 2022 per Chainwire), which appears in the prose and in the timeline. The 2016 start date is unsupported and the '8-of-6 multisig' is almost certainly a typo. Many fine-grained details could not be verified because the primary Summer.fi blog was unreachable.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":11,"sequence_num":5,"subject_status":"shut_down","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}