Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · More Markets
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 22 → 17 (-5)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443561831
- Off-chain at
- 2026-09-02T00:39:44.148Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3JhjuoBwBbfG94xmXvieqPEGjg6bHiwNTezPkUp2X623
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2558 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"700e79a0dc050ae7d8b9672c772ac370","band_override":{"actual_delta":-5,"actual_verdict":"review_revise","disputed_pct":0,"expected_delta_range":[0,0],"expected_verdict":"review_approve","rationale":"The reviewer confirmed 9 of 12 claims outright and found zero disputed claims, so the page's central factual account of the More Markets exploit — the loss estimate, the attack mechanism, the protocol's disputed response, and the comparison to the Moonwell and Tectonic incidents — is well supported. However, two high-priority coverage gaps push this out of a clean approval: the page presents Blockaid's and More Markets' competing loss figures without any on-chain trace to arbitrate them, and it omits depositor impact and reimbursement information (coverage_gaps[0], coverage_gaps[3]). The review also flagged that one citation (coindesk.cc) is a look-alike mirror rather than the official CoinDesk domain, and that the page's $139.7M August loss figure reflects only one tracker without disclosing a competing $136M estimate (claim_findings[4], claim_findings[8]). These are precision and sourcing issues, not factual errors, warranting revision rather than denial."},"decided_at":"2026-09-02T00:39:43.953Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"3bc40226-b428-428b-b2ef-cb5f01f547a3","new_score":17,"page_slug":"more-markets","prev_score":22,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 9 of 12 claims outright and found zero disputed claims, so the page's central factual account of the More Markets exploit — the loss estimate, the attack mechanism, the protocol's disputed response, and the comparison to the Moonwell and Tectonic incidents — is well supported. However, two high-priority coverage gaps push this out of a clean approval: the page presents Blockaid's and More Markets' competing loss figures without any on-chain trace to arbitrate them, and it omits depositor impact and reimbursement information (coverage_gaps[0], coverage_gaps[3]). The review also flagged that one citation (coindesk.cc) is a look-alike mirror rather than the official CoinDesk domain, and that the page's $139.7M August loss figure reflects only one tracker without disclosing a competing $136M estimate (claim_findings[4], claim_findings[8]). These are precision and sourcing issues, not factual errors, warranting revision rather than denial.","score_delta":-5,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}