Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 2 → 2 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425402862
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-09T20:45:55.711Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- AfaHVGdXfg9jVL5UboY461q5GebbsW4Yor8kAdK2pUux
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1414 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-09T20:45:55.622Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"19a3fa1c-c5f0-4541-8433-c1d8a05d9807","new_score":2,"page_slug":"truebit-oracle-exploit-january-2026","prev_score":2,"reason":"The page accurately captures the core facts of the January 2026 Truebit exploit — the attack date, primary ETH loss, exploit mechanism, attacker wallet addresses, transaction hash, laundering timeline, and team response are all confirmed by multiple independent sources. The main accuracy issue is the Solidity version claim (v0.5.3 vs. v0.6.10): the page characterizes the vulnerable logic contract as compiled with v0.5.3 following rekt.news, but multiple more technically rigorous sources (SlowMist, BlockSec, Olympix, FinanceFeeds) and Etherscan's own bytecode confirm the implementation contract uses v0.6.10 — v0.5.3 describes only the proxy wrapper. The funding bridge is also disputed (Across Protocol per rekt.news vs. Rhino.fi per SlowMist's on-chain forensics). Two cited URLs (CoinTelegraph's specific article URL and blockchain.news) are inaccessible. No claims were found to be affirmatively false; the partially_supported findings represent overprecision or propagation of rekt.news technical inaccuracies rather than fabrication.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}