Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · Raft Protocol
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 12 → 12 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 424182415
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-04T05:42:12.337Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- GBZsWX8gFnPUBh19bEH82JsjsC2Yyt6GRN8bdXesFCEK
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1408 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-04T05:42:12.107Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"4ca64fe1-1c2b-442d-84e9-ddd98e3729f2","new_score":12,"page_slug":"raft-protocol","prev_score":12,"reason":"The reviewer examined 22 claims and found 14 confirmed, 4 partially supported, 1 disputed, and 1 unverifiable, yielding a disputed_pct of 9% — within the approval band. The single disputed claim (claim_findings[19], timeline launch date of January 2023 vs. the confirmed June 5, 2023 mainnet launch) is a peripheral background fact that does not affect the core exploit narrative. The four partially-supported findings are minor: an internal inconsistency between sections on the attacker's retained ETH (7 ETH mid-transaction vs. 14 ETH post-fee, both figures plausible at different on-chain moments), a section understating the R stablecoin depeg floor (showing $0.70 when the actual low was $0.18), and limited independent sourcing for two auditor names. Link rot on the Mirror.xyz post-mortem and ImmueBytes URLs (claim_findings[14], [16]) did not leave any claim without corroboration from other sources. A high-priority coverage gap on the protocol's final shutdown status is noted for expansion but does not reflect inaccuracy in the current page.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}