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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_approve · Raft Protocol
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
1212 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
424182415
Off-chain at
2026-06-04T05:42:12.337Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
GBZsWX8gFnPUBh19bEH82JsjsC2Yyt6GRN8bdXesFCEK
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1408 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-04T05:42:12.107Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"4ca64fe1-1c2b-442d-84e9-ddd98e3729f2","new_score":12,"page_slug":"raft-protocol","prev_score":12,"reason":"The reviewer examined 22 claims and found 14 confirmed, 4 partially supported, 1 disputed, and 1 unverifiable, yielding a disputed_pct of 9% — within the approval band. The single disputed claim (claim_findings[19], timeline launch date of January 2023 vs. the confirmed June 5, 2023 mainnet launch) is a peripheral background fact that does not affect the core exploit narrative. The four partially-supported findings are minor: an internal inconsistency between sections on the attacker's retained ETH (7 ETH mid-transaction vs. 14 ETH post-fee, both figures plausible at different on-chain moments), a section understating the R stablecoin depeg floor (showing $0.70 when the actual low was $0.18), and limited independent sourcing for two auditor names. Link rot on the Mirror.xyz post-mortem and ImmueBytes URLs (claim_findings[14], [16]) did not leave any claim without corroboration from other sources. A high-priority coverage gap on the protocol's final shutdown status is noted for expansion but does not reflect inaccuracy in the current page.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}