Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Zilliqa
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 61 → 46 (-15)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443520627
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T11:33:29.392Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- dy1A4xBsayszpp9DSsc2NXGQfsuJrPP5n4EoWidLWaA
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1721 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T11:33:29.061Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"ce7cc7ce-9d4c-4917-970b-fdb83d8d0837","new_score":46,"page_slug":"zilliqa","prev_score":61,"reason":"Only 1 of 30 checked claims was disputed and 1 was unverifiable (6.7% combined), which on its own would support leaving the page as-is. However, the review identified two high-priority coverage gaps that outweigh the raw percentage: the page's entire 'Blame Attribution: Disputed and Unresolved' section and several related claims about the July 2026 exchange theft (claim_findings[4], [6], [11], [13], [29]) present the root cause and the affected exchange's identity as unresolved, but Zilliqa's own official post-mortem, published six days before this review, already names the exchange, discloses the exact amount stolen, and confirms the root cause. The review also found that the page's claim of a 'separate, distinct incident from March 2025' involving Bithumb (claim_findings[8]) is not supported by any of the page's own eight cited sources and appears to conflate a March 2026 date with a nonexistent 2025 event. A second high-priority gap flags the page's silence on ZIL's roughly 99% decline from its 2021 high. These gaps warrant sending the page back for revision with a modest score reduction; they do not, on their own, meet the threshold for suspending the page or removing it from the index, since the underlying disputed/unverifiable share of claims remains low and the founding, audit-history, and February 2025 exploit narrative all check out cleanly.","score_delta":-15,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}