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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
0 → 0 (-22)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
465103982
Off-chain at
2026-11-04T00:41:27.540Z
Anchored at
2026-11-04T00:41:39.000Z
Block time
2026-11-04T00:41:39.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
BAvN5vNjuYMja6edAqkhPNNbcBMHcL39wLviKbRY6bQp
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1995 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"e468c938db072b76f565c013d8c4cd97","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-04T00:41:27.261Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.3571,"investigation_id":"4ff5739b-91ad-4d18-ba47-33ab96f78d03","judge_def_hash":"750934ecb48272224909b7430fab271676d391380fbc821acbe7ee7e4cac2fa3","new_score":0,"page_slug":"crypto-clipper-worm-microsoft-dcu-takedown-june-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"Five of 13 claims (about 38%) could not be verified, which falls in the significant-issues band; none were source-blocked and none were directly contradicted. The technical malware details match Microsoft's primary blog (claim_findings[0], [2], [3]), but the 14-country count, the USD 45 million loss figure and the Eastern Europe attribution note have no primary support (claim_findings[8], [9], [10]). The page also implies a link between CryptoBandits and the StealC/Amadey takedown that no source supports (claim_findings[12], omission_findings[1]), and the 140,000-infection figure is misattributed (claim_findings[4]). The Europol release could not be read, so the 182 IP and 47 domain breakdown remains unchecked; reviewer confidence was moderate, so the penalty is kept in the middle of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"3839668b232611e5b26db72079d64745f8e57e919b8a379e79b44ba4a52c845b","score_delta":-22,"score_limit":{"applied":-22,"limited":false,"proposed":-22,"rule":"second_opinion_agreed","second":-22},"sequence_num":3,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"significant","reason":"The review reports a material omission: the page headline and summary imply a Microsoft DCU takedown of the CryptoBandits clipper, but no source links CryptoBandits to the StealC/Amadey infrastructure disrupted in Operation Endgame. This reinforces the significant band already implied by the percentage."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}