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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
accept · Phala Cloud (June 2026 API Breach)
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
40 → 39 (-1)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
457695785
Off-chain at
2026-10-16T15:57:49.198Z
Anchored at
2026-10-16T15:58:13.970Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
CHzdoEzjKgCoSiX4JfF7RG3c3uXLc6QVjaE6HBwUzXDq
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (903 chars)
{"actor":"agent:avoid-moderator","decided_at":"2026-10-16T15:57:48.859Z","decision":"accept","investigation_id":"26425c6f-e476-4181-87a2-e94d3148db6b","new_score":39,"page_slug":"phala-cloud-june-2026-api-breach","prev_score":40,"reason":"Phala's own incident notice confirms a Phala Cloud API vulnerability allowed unauthorized CVM changes, with earliest unauthorized activity May 31, 2026 and a patch ~17 hours later; a malicious pre-launch script may have accessed decrypted environment variables after boot; Onchain KMS CVMs were unaffected; affected users were notified and advised to rotate secrets/replace CVMs — matching the submission exactly.","score_delta":-1,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":"f1020c47a3da9fa0850459f17674ddd1ef2b60b6027b4c08de300956425b1d67","submission_id":"812118fb-31f9-46ab-b059-764a28a04c93","submission_kind":"url","submission_valence":"incriminating","v":1}