Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · StablR
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 12 → 5 (-7)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 423716284
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-02T02:11:27.825Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- ARcLZXdzdf5wfgXj3gUBgcsva5HSzPHKBtWXNeQJd3uC
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1653 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-02T02:11:27.576Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"67c1f560-0143-47ba-8309-7ce127131ff6","new_score":5,"page_slug":"stablr","prev_score":12,"reason":"The core exploit narrative — 1-of-3 multisig compromise, $13.5M in unbacked tokens minted, $2.8M extracted, dual depeg, and StablR's MiCA reserve shortfall — is confirmed by multiple independent Tier 1-2 sources and holds up well. The reviewer's disputed_pct of 9.4% sits just under the 10% approval threshold, but three factors push the verdict to revise rather than approve: (1) claim_findings[14] and claim_findings[15] present contested depeg price extremes (EURR at €0.70 / USDR at $0.40) as established lows when most sources cite materially different figures, without adequate attribution; (2) claim_findings[32] mischaracterizes the 2020 Payvision criminal complaint as a DNB filing when it was filed by EFRI citing a DNB report — a minor but material distinction in a section about regulatory risk; and (3) two CoinReporter citations (claim_findings[13], claim_findings[18], and timeline entry 8) are confirmed link-rotted, leaving the specific attacker address list and a ZachXBT timestamp claim without live sourcing. Additionally, three high-priority coverage gaps — on-chain address verification, post-exploit recovery status as of review date, and the MFSA's response to the confirmed MiCA reserve shortfall — indicate the page requires substantive updates before it can be considered current.","score_delta":-7,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}