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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · StablR
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
125 (-7)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
423716284
Off-chain at
2026-06-02T02:11:27.825Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
ARcLZXdzdf5wfgXj3gUBgcsva5HSzPHKBtWXNeQJd3uC
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1653 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-02T02:11:27.576Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"67c1f560-0143-47ba-8309-7ce127131ff6","new_score":5,"page_slug":"stablr","prev_score":12,"reason":"The core exploit narrative — 1-of-3 multisig compromise, $13.5M in unbacked tokens minted, $2.8M extracted, dual depeg, and StablR's MiCA reserve shortfall — is confirmed by multiple independent Tier 1-2 sources and holds up well. The reviewer's disputed_pct of 9.4% sits just under the 10% approval threshold, but three factors push the verdict to revise rather than approve: (1) claim_findings[14] and claim_findings[15] present contested depeg price extremes (EURR at €0.70 / USDR at $0.40) as established lows when most sources cite materially different figures, without adequate attribution; (2) claim_findings[32] mischaracterizes the 2020 Payvision criminal complaint as a DNB filing when it was filed by EFRI citing a DNB report — a minor but material distinction in a section about regulatory risk; and (3) two CoinReporter citations (claim_findings[13], claim_findings[18], and timeline entry 8) are confirmed link-rotted, leaving the specific attacker address list and a ZachXBT timestamp claim without live sourcing. Additionally, three high-priority coverage gaps — on-chain address verification, post-exploit recovery status as of review date, and the MFSA's response to the confirmed MiCA reserve shortfall — indicate the page requires substantive updates before it can be considered current.","score_delta":-7,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}