Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_approve · StablR — Multisig Exploit and EURR/USDR Depeg
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 28 → 28 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443515747
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T18:03:43.503Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3xkzMmrnHydMRXmTMhhe2Ud5fwWW1GipFocFL1LpvxwU
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2043 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T18:03:43.266Z","decision":"review_approve","investigation_id":"3758620e-d099-427e-aa60-da826e35cd86","new_score":28,"page_slug":"stablr-multisig-exploit-and-eurr-usdr-depeg","prev_score":28,"reason":"The reviewer checked 20 factual claims against primary and independent sources and found zero disputed and only one unverifiable (a secondary USDR intraday-low figure that falls in the same range as, and is not contradicted by, other reporting). That yields a disputed_pct of 5%, well inside the approve band. Every core allegation on the page — the 1-of-3 multisig key compromise (claim_findings[3]), the ~$13.5M unbacked mint (claim_findings[4]), the confirmed MiCA 1:1 backing shortfall quoted verbatim from StablR's own disclosure (claim_findings[11]), and the ongoing minting/redemption suspension and regulatory silence (claim_findings[13]-[18]) — was confirmed, several against primary-source, word-for-word text. The four partially_supported findings (claim_findings[5], [6], [7], [9]) are precision issues on secondary figures — an attacker-proceeds total the page's own cited article later revises upward, a root-cause framing that a security-firm headline states slightly differently, a depeg-percentage range that is the page's own calculation rather than a directly quoted figure, and reliance on the issuer's self-report for reserve intactness — none of which touch or contradict the page's central narrative. No link rot or staleness was found on any citation, and the reviewer rated its own confidence at 0.78. The reserve-intactness gap and the missing newest EFRI follow-up were logged as medium/low-priority coverage gaps by the reviewer, not high-priority, and the page already attributes the reserve-intact assertion to StablR rather than presenting it as independently verified fact, so no override of that calibration is warranted here.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}