Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · dTRINITY dLEND
- Sequence
- #8
- Score
- 40 → 35 (-5)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462908673
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-29T14:06:24.644Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-29T14:06:54.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-29T14:06:54.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 855tTKWreAz9YVLiRtD8jtuVf5MfB9VfLYUTc38JddhZ
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1440 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"1437cdc16f4f7d96c6113bb9bd3a10b2","band_override":null,"blocked_count":1,"decided_at":"2026-10-29T14:06:24.330Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.125,"investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":35,"page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":40,"reason":"Of 9 claims reviewed, 1 could not be read because the source blocked the reviewer (claim_findings[5], Cyberscope) and is excluded; of the remaining 8, none were disputed and 1 was unverifiable (claim_findings[8], the dapp listing, which was not fetched), giving about 12.5%, which falls in the minor band. Both exploit accounts, the team responses and the Hashlock audit match their sources. Two soft spots remain: the TVL decline is described as following the security incidents although the page itself says no source attributes it (claim_findings[7]), and the page omits the temporary suspension of the Ethereum deployment and the repayment outcome (minor omission). A small penalty is applied; the subject is operating and nothing contradicts the page.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-5,"scored_claims":8,"sequence_num":8,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}