Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · requests-secure-v2
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443514527
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T13:35:05.049Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 6KPmVMumBTpUSg4XUn6kRZiVDF2S9SuEsoLcmuWxSvpt
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1228 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T13:35:04.679Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"05607536-644a-4a27-874b-e8189103aed1","new_score":0,"page_slug":"requests-secure-v2","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's central and most consequential claim -- that no verifiable public record documents a package named requests-secure-v2 -- is well-supported and independently corroborated, and the page correctly and consistently distinguishes the alleged fake package from the genuine, widely-used requests library without ever misattributing wrongdoing to its real maintainers. However, several supporting claims about the broader threat archetype contain citation-precision errors: a wallet-name list is misattributed to the ReversingLabs BIPClip source when it actually belongs to a separately-cited Checkmarx campaign, the TrapDoor timeline entry states a detection date (May 19, 2026) not found in its cited source (which gives May 22-24, 2026), and a claim that security changes were made to 'both registries' (RubyGems and PyPI) is only supported for PyPI in the cited source.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}