Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · TrueBit Oracle Exploit (January 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 2 → 0 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425402866
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-09T20:45:55.769Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3xAvgAtAYBBLAoeWVQztBqCE11eP7kQdqPuh3SN44Zdq
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1562 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-09T20:45:55.622Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"19a3fa1c-c5f0-4541-8433-c1d8a05d9807","new_score":0,"page_slug":"truebit-oracle-exploit-january-2026","prev_score":2,"reason":"All core facts of the exploit — date, ETH loss, exploit mechanism, transaction hash, attacker wallet, and laundering timeline — are confirmed by multiple independent sources including CoinDesk (Tier 1), SlowMist, and Halborn. No claims were found to be affirmatively false. However, seven claims are only partially supported, with two technically inaccurate details warranting correction: the Solidity version attributed to the vulnerable logic contract is v0.5.3 (claim_findings[1]) but four independent security analyses including SlowMist and BlockSec confirm the implementation contract uses v0.6.10 — only the proxy wrapper is v0.5.3; and the attacker funding bridge is cited as Across Protocol (claim_findings[12]) while SlowMist's on-chain forensics attribute it to Rhino.fi. The floor price for TRU post-crash (claim_findings[4]) is contested across Tier 1 aggregators. Two cited URLs have link rot (blockchain.news and CCN primary URL). One high-priority coverage gap remains: no direct block explorer links to the primary exploit transaction are accepted as evidence. These issues are correctional rather than structural and do not affect the page's overall severity assessment.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}