Verify a decision

{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-26T06:06:25.094Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"70aa1b03-25c0-46a1-9a98-454053e9d96a","new_score":22,"page_slug":"kelp-dao","prev_score":32,"reason":"Of the 36 claims the reviewer actually checked, 28 were confirmed, 3 partially supported, 4 unverifiable, and 1 disputed, putting the disputed-plus-unverifiable rate at about 13.9% -- inside the minor-issues band. The one disputed item (claim_findings[33]) is an omission: the page calls it an open question whether Kelp's post-exploit bridge is multi-verifier, when reporting shows Kelp actually dropped LayerZero for Chainlink CCIP weeks after the hack. That is a stale-but-cautious framing rather than a false reassurance, so it understates currency without misleading readers about safety. More consequential is claim_findings[32], where the page states an AWS Lambda/single-key centralization risk was 'demonstrated, not hypothetical' by the April 2026 exploit, when the exploit was actually caused by the bridge provider's verifier/RPC infrastructure -- a real incident is being used to inflate the credibility of an unrelated architectural criticism. A separate figure (claim_findings[1]) understates Kelp's pre-exploit peak TVL against other reporting and blends depositor/integration counts from an earlier, lower-TVL period, a presentational error rather than a risk-relevant one. The high-priority coverage gap on exchange delistings of KERNEL is a real omission that would improve the page, but it does not leave any existing claim false -- the page's narrower 'no SEC/CFTC/OFAC action' statement remains accurate -- so it argues for expansion rather than escalation. On the positive side, the page correctly sources the team's public dispute with LayerZero and later migration announcement rather than asserting an unsupported 'inactive team' narrative.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}