Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 20 → 20 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443513885
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T12:55:29.518Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3dYqVUeVgoY4eYx84JfesKf6x4qZbgSk2LyNf8yVygYk
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1269 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T12:55:29.387Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"f74f4088-dfe6-458b-8b9f-d6ac9d197312","new_score":20,"page_slug":"allbridge-core-second-flash-loan-exploit-july-2026","prev_score":20,"reason":"The page's core narrative -- a July 19-20, 2026 flash-loan exploit draining ~$1.65-1.66M from Allbridge Core's Solana pools via a Kamino flash loan, followed by a three-month wind-down announcement -- is well supported by multiple independent, directly-fetched sources, and the 2023 comparison figures are accurately kept distinct from the 2026 figures (no cross-incident conflation was found). However, the page contains a genuine internal contradiction in its on-chain withdrawal breakdown figures, a misleading framing in the Risk Assessment section that credits six post-2023 audits with 'missing' a Solana-specific gap when only two post-date 2023 and neither was scoped to Solana, one misdated industry-context claim (Transit Finance's May 2026 hack listed as a July 2026 incident), and an unverified 'nine-step manipulation sequence' framing not found in any consulted source.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}