Skip to main content
AVOID.NET
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_approve_with_notes · Hypurr NFTs
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
4274 (+32)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443509536
Off-chain at
2026-08-19T16:40:05.815Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
9i7ke8yPsZnMpTGPfMrfZG2iT5dqVJpSxvBVvaMMiKu4
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2517 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-19T16:40:05.696Z","decision":"review_approve_with_notes","investigation_id":"a11c7577-4338-477d-8f85-f61ec2de41f6","new_score":74,"page_slug":"hypurr-nfts","prev_score":42,"reason":"This is a calibration review: the page's facts hold up (0 of 11 claims disputed; the two weaker verdicts are minor date/precision issues, not material errors), so the content itself is approved with notes. The score, however, is miscalibrated. Per calibration_assessment and the rubric's own attribution test, the only incident actually tied to Hypurr NFTs / the Hyper Foundation is a third-party wallet-phishing theft against individual Genesis Event recipients (claim_findings[1]-[2], [8]); the cited reporting explicitly attributes the compromise to victim-side wallet security failures, not to any flaw, negligence, or misconduct by the Foundation (claim_findings[2], sources_consulted notes on thedefiant.io). The three other timeline incidents (JELLYJELLY, Hyperdrive, HyperVault) concern separate Hyperliquid-ecosystem protocols and were correctly flagged by the reviewer as ecosystem context that should not be conflated with the entity under review (coverage_gaps[3]). A current score of 42/WARNING implies entity-attributable risk that the evidence does not support; a third-party-attributed incident against an otherwise legitimately delivered, actively-traded product maps to the low end of VERIFIED, not WARNING. Notes: (Populate the empty page `sections` with narrative content — currently only summary and timeline carry substance.) (Correct the HyperVault timeline date to Sept 26, 2025 per the independently corroborating source (page currently states Sept 28).) (Correct the floor-price-settlement timeline date to align with the cited article's own Sept 29 dateline (page currently states Oct 1).) (Replace or supplement the low-credibility (tier 3) sole source for the $62M/24h trading-volume figure with a verifiable secondary source.) (Explicitly label the JELLYJELLY, Hyperdrive, and HyperVault timeline entries as ecosystem context distinct from Hypurr NFTs / Hyper Foundation to avoid guilt-by-association.) (Add coverage of any post-incident developments (recovery, attacker identification/sanctions, wallet-security changes) given the page's freshest substantive reporting is nearly a year stale relative to the current date.)","score_delta":32,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}