Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443518095
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T22:49:25.234Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 9dMJSbr1hHNoWcu8bsLjXXXSHCmLrUyZDqEbXkFeHj7d
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1500 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T22:49:25.087Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"a531e342-f813-4cf2-ad17-392497d9e60f","new_score":0,"page_slug":"mica-post-deadline-impersonation-scam-cluster-esma-amf-warning-august-2026","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core claims — the MiCA transitional-period expiry, ESMA/AMF register statistics, ESMA and AMF's confirmed reports of being impersonated, and Belgium's FSMA blacklist of six named unauthorized entities — are well corroborated by primary regulatory sources and multiple independent news outlets, with no link rot found in the sources checked. The main soft spots are the summary's grouping of all four regulators (ESMA, AMF, AFM, FSMA) under a single claim of having 'documented a significant surge in impersonation scams,' when only ESMA and AMF are independently documented as confirming they were specifically impersonated (AFM issued a general caution and FSMA's action targeted unauthorized providers, a distinction the page itself draws correctly in its Attribution section), and the unsourced specific naming of Coinbase, Kraken, and OKX as impersonation targets, which does not appear in any source reviewed. All real firms and regulators named in the page are clearly and consistently framed as victims of impersonation or as licensed/legitimate entities, not as wrongdoers.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}