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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#5
Score
50 → 50 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
457520977
Off-chain at
2026-10-16T05:29:17.605Z
Anchored at
2026-10-16T05:29:48.758Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
21sHgh9wK2fZD853y49M3Fywsmr9gkJ9iSHypNKCFHPd
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2352 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"c86a855855fcc1f40874117b4988480e","decided_at":"2026-10-16T05:29:17.363Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.16,"findings_hash":"6NJQ7bKLr2LfjYdCaDzpXR6TjZmWc6sGCLKxQnrtFhDx","investigation_id":"e8972dc5-6b5b-4ab9-9e05-1974d92b8c54","mode":"findings_only","new_score":50,"page_content_hash":"a89d36dc3329dfeaac013fe77fa6447af3a003fc9828549cd8cac4919af48640","page_slug":"dmm-bitcoin","prev_score":50,"reason":"The page's core narrative — the May 31, 2024 theft of 4,502.9 BTC via a Ginco supply-chain compromise, the FBI/DC3/NPA attribution to TraderTraitor/Lazarus Group, the FSA business improvement order, and the exchange's wind-down into SBI VC Trade — is well supported by both the cited reporting and independent primary sources (the Kanto Local Finance Bureau's own notice, FinCEN's Huione release, and multiple outlets' coverage of the TRM Labs and ZachXBT findings). Two factual errors were found: the Coincheck comparison cites '$523 million in NEM token losses,' which conflates the count of NEM tokens stolen with the dollar value (commonly reported near $530 million), and the Huione Guarantee sentence misattributes Elliptic's $11 billion on-chain-flow estimate to the FinCEN finding, when FinCEN's own release cites a different, smaller figure (~$4 billion). One sentence overstates Chainalysis's role by saying it 'independently confirmed' North Korean attribution, when the cited Chainalysis post merely labels the hack as North Korea-affiliated without presenting confirming evidence. Three sourcing problems were found: a TechCrunch citation's stored archive snapshot points to an unrelated 2026 article (an easy fix with a valid replacement snapshot found), and two citations (a Medium 'tokyo-fintech' post and a ForexGDP post) returned HTTP 403 and could not be found via search, matching the page's own 'unarchivable' metadata for both. The underlying claims attached to the Medium citation are independently confirmed via the primary Japanese regulator notice; the ForexGDP citation's relevance to its section is unclear and it should likely be removed. No accepted_submissions exist for this page, so there is no community evidence to review.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}