Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Manic Android Banking Trojan
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-5)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462181914
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T19:02:48.280Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T19:03:11.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T19:03:11.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- CMCvRsc4TcU9JfRoWR1fiZrFiCq21CDXsDP3vVLpytBt
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1382 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"347dbdbeb85ef6bf5b01b2f199f1a54e","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T19:02:47.986Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1111,"investigation_id":"039f4f91-abad-47bb-896d-1d08485ebfc5","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":0,"page_slug":"manic-android-banking-trojan","prev_score":0,"reason":"Eight of the nine checked claims were confirmed against ThreatFabric, BleepingComputer and The Hacker News, including the publication date, the 169 package IDs, the four-hop relay, the overlay behavior and the Google statement. One claim (claim_findings[6]) could not be verified: the detail that the reset_password command returns \"not supported\" was not visible in the source, although the command itself is confirmed. That is 1 of 9 findings (about 11%), which falls in the minor-issues band; the penalty is kept at the low end because the unverified detail is peripheral. claim_findings[4] also notes that two dates are attributed to ThreatFabric but come from The Hacker News. No shutdown or omission was reported.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-5,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}