Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · NEAR Intents Omni Exploit October 2026 ($3.8M)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 62 → 51 (-11)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462050623
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-27T11:17:26.761Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-27T11:17:49.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-27T11:17:49.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3GYMKWEvxmeoFywu9jBCArRU7SrVWTuThLdT9qnubtCi
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2306 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"b4f54dcbfb0cbe16057d63d768a7e914","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-27T11:17:26.256Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.1667,"investigation_id":"769492c4-6a2e-41a0-90f4-ac9fad70fb6f","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":51,"page_slug":"near-intents-omni-exploit-october-2026-3-8m","prev_score":62,"reason":"The incident narrative (amount, asset, KuCoin and Bitcoin tracing, 48-hour ultimatum, full return and closure of the investigation) is well supported by the sources checked. The stated root cause, an Omni and contract interaction bug, appears in three places (claim_findings[0], [1], [2]) and was reportedly superseded by the project's Oct 16 postmortem, which places the flaw in a deposit-notification bug in the NEAR Intents contract. The page also omits that the postmortem was published (omission_findings[0], material). The penalty sits at the lighter end of the band because the correction rests on a secondary outlet rather than the primary postmortem, the reviewer's confidence is 0.7, and the funds were fully recovered. Smaller details (15:43 UTC time, Bitget breach date, balance-adjustment statement) were not found in the cited sources.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-11,"score_limit":{"applied":-11,"limited":true,"proposed":-18,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"sequence_num":3,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"minor","reason":"Strictly counting only disputed and unverifiable findings gives 2/12 (about 17%, minor band). However, claim_findings[0], [1] and [2] are all stale on the page's core root-cause claim (summary, Technical Vulnerability and Incident Overview sections), and omission_findings[0] is material: the page says a postmortem was promised but never reports the Oct 16 postmortem that relocates the flaw to the NEAR Intents contract. Counting the stale root-cause findings gives about 42%, so the significant band applies. The coverage gap on the primary-source postmortem is high priority."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}