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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review · Zabu Finance
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#2
Score
18 → 18 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
426700979
Off-chain at
2026-06-15T19:50:05.075Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
GPiddwpJ4tSoZZEwvVUkqjmChYvwU6dewaZuMaZLq9HM
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1184 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-06-15T19:50:04.967Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"165277a4-bd68-46b8-92c0-11ffcadf8ec3","new_score":18,"page_slug":"zabu-finance","prev_score":18,"reason":"The page's core factual claims about the September 12, 2021 exploit — amount, mechanism, DEXes involved, and 'first Avalanche DeFi hack' characterization — are well-supported by multiple credible sources. Two claims are unverifiable (specific SSL expiry date) and three are partially supported due to a digit transposition in the token burn figure (93.12 vs 93.21 million) and an incorrect date for the PolyYeld exploit (July 1 stated vs July 28 confirmed). No claims are directly disputed by more credible sources. A significant structural issue is that all six section content fields are empty, and the Wikipedia ZachXBT citation has no apparent connection to Zabu Finance. The current trust score of 18 (CRITICAL) is a known miscalibration — the entity suffered a hack rather than committing fraud, placing it in the CAUTIONARY band.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}