Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 10 → 10 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457660964
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T13:52:33.046Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T13:52:47.862Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- FWatcMYfktjWk4Q3vu2soGkDp5yxcw35TfAqjLTMEby
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2378 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"dfdf27317ecda099fb845865ed67bc0c","decided_at":"2026-10-16T13:52:32.835Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.4231,"findings_hash":"AoMQApxeVotrBgL3vaFa1SFe1f5hGGZvtV9SSnNYjPj7","investigation_id":"f74f4088-dfe6-458b-8b9f-d6ac9d197312","mode":"findings_only","new_score":10,"page_content_hash":"a3bd4de21f85a1af31eef37b9d5c97d41133f8649e48abe8657917e920d6fb5c","page_slug":"allbridge-core-second-flash-loan-exploit-july-2026","prev_score":10,"reason":"The page's core facts -- the July 19-20, 2026 date, the $1.65-1.66 million loss range (with Onchain Lens's narrower ~$1.1M figure correctly flagged as a separate methodology), the $1.12 million Kamino flash loan, the 2023 BNB Chain precedent, the TVL decline, and Allbridge's pause and CCTP/LayerZero pivot announcement -- are all well corroborated by multiple independent, credible sources. The page is also commendably transparent about conflicting figures across outlets in several places. However, the Attack Mechanics section asserts a specific, confident technical narrative (a nine-step manipulation sequence, static dynamic fees, absent TWAP guards, non-triggering circuit breakers, and a Rebalancer Authority that reacted too slowly) that is not supported by any of its own cited sources and conflicts with the most rigorous independent technical analysis found (BlockSec), which attributes the exploit to an account-aliasing bug and explicitly notes Allbridge's own post-mortem lacks code-level detail. The page also overstates sourcing for the claim that Allbridge's single-pool fix was confirmed applied to BNB Chain but missed on Solana (two of four cited outlets do not address this at all), misattributes a 'structurally impossible' quote to the 2023 postmortem itself rather than to later reporters, gets one Hacken audit date wrong by roughly a year with no independent confirmation of a Kudelski Security audit at all, names specific privacy-laundering protocols (Railgun, NEAR Intents, Zcash Orchard) that neither of two directly-checked cited sources mention, and places a May 2026 Transit Finance exploit within a list of 'July 2026' bridge incidents. An unsourced '890,000 wallets' figure could not be verified anywhere.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}