Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Resolv USR Stablecoin Minting Exploit (March 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 12 → 2 (-10)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425396297
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-09T20:02:36.164Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 6HFY2DhmZP3JoM4sc8C2Z2VHMYJwWL5WZRsnjsMs1DaH
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1433 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-09T20:02:34.998Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"60229d5c-8a90-4fce-8606-a33620bc4fcc","new_score":2,"page_slug":"resolv-usr-stablecoin-minting-exploit-march-2026","prev_score":12,"reason":"The core narrative of this investigation — the AWS KMS compromise, the 80 million unbacked USR minting, the ~$23-25 million ETH extraction, and the tiered compensation plan — is well-supported by multiple Tier 1 sources and is not in question. Two factual errors require correction: claim_findings[7] places the second minting transaction at 04:21 UTC, but the official Resolv postmortem and CertiK both record 03:41 UTC (a 40-minute discrepancy); and claim_findings[18] states Fluid absorbed 'more than $10 million in bad debt' when confirmed post-mortem reporting from multiple sources puts the figure at $19.3M–$21M, roughly double the stated amount. Additionally, claim_findings[11] references a Cisco patch date of March 18 that contradicts NVD's authoritative record of March 4, affecting the timeline entry at timeline[4]. The Hivepro source cited for CVE attribution returned a 404 error. Reviewer confidence is high (0.82) and the disputed claims are correctible without affecting the overall severity characterization of the incident.","score_delta":-10,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}