Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Yearn Finance DAI Vault Exploit
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 52 → 44 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 425568688
- Off-chain at
- 2026-06-10T15:00:47.073Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- DTXcoCzGJdoEZYqouxktNerBiFT6yF3PbWCLhv7LauMh
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1377 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-06-10T15:00:46.817Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"47882469-b5ed-42df-800b-ba3d06f5fe18","new_score":44,"page_slug":"yearn-dai-vault","prev_score":52,"reason":"All core facts on this page — the exploit date, vault loss ($11M), attacker profit ($2.8M), Tether freeze ($1.7M), 11-minute response time, MakerDAO reimbursement mechanics, and Nexus Mutual claims statistics — are confirmed by Tier 1 sources. The reviewer's 15% disputed figure reflects six partially-supported claims, none of which are contradicted by a higher-credibility source; they concern granular attack-mechanics figures (flash loan ETH amounts, per-cycle DAI flows) that appear in secondary analysis but are absent from the official Yearn security disclosure. Two unverifiable claims (claim_findings[12] per-cycle DAI amounts, claim_findings[27] Nexus Mutual processing start date) and link rot on two CoinTelegraph URLs (claim_findings[6], claim_findings[21]) are minor quality issues. One medium-priority coverage gap — the page presents Cover Protocol as an active ecosystem partner without noting Yearn cancelled that partnership in March 2021 — requires a contextual correction to avoid misleading readers.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}