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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Shibarium Bridge
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#4
Score
42 → 42 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
464377503
Off-chain at
2026-11-02T05:27:41.357Z
Anchored at
2026-11-02T05:27:53.000Z
Block time
2026-11-02T05:27:53.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
9viqYUfuyXLynwDP5njm8G2SanziemMVWHXFbgncVy9d
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1644 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"3fedcf3b871c97d0d25f41df3af29a0e","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T05:27:41.148Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2,"investigation_id":"4511c051-1302-4bc4-b6aa-bc3bdc34bb74","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":42,"page_slug":"shibarium-bridge","prev_score":42,"reason":"One of five checked claims is disputed (20%): claim_findings[0] gives about 72.6 billion SHIB stolen, while The Block reports 92.6 billion. claim_findings[2] is only partially supported, because Decrypt credits Beosin rather than PeckShield for confirming the funds were stuck. The core exploit mechanism and the October 2025 bridge reopening are supported. omission_findings[0] shows the page stops at October 2025 and omits the 2026 K9 Finance sunset and compensation dispute, and a high-priority coverage gap covers the same period. The reviewer's confidence is moderate-low (0.55) and only a sample of sources was fetched, so the penalty stays within the minor band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"minor","from_band":"minor","reason":"The review reports a material omission (K9 Finance sunset and compensation dispute in 2026) that leaves the page's refund status stale. This is not a shutdown or exploit the page hides, so it is held to the minor band, but at its harshest end."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}