Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Zentra Finance ctUSD Aave-Fork Exploit
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 30 → 26 (-4)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462279321
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-28T00:48:38.413Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-28T00:49:15.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-28T00:49:15.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- G1PeFGx1f1aeAXZMoPVZhFwSJEbW5E6RNZREGcz5Tm3U
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1515 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"62e69d10ea4eaa0cd3f0f5a18cd1130b","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-28T00:48:38.131Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2727,"investigation_id":"0494be34-a966-4de8-8be4-a06877a27149","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":26,"page_slug":"zentra-finance-ctusd-aave-fork-exploit","prev_score":30,"reason":"Of 11 checked claims, 3 (about 27%) were disputed or could not be verified, which falls in the minor-issues band. claim_findings[0] and [1] are disputed: the page says Zentra published a post-mortem on September 11, but the cited article says attack details had not been published, and the mechanism came from a third-party DeFiHackLabs proof of concept. claim_findings[6] (a June 2023 refactor that bypassed an audit) has no support in the cited source. The core exploit facts (date, amount, block, mechanism, deadline, Citrea restoration) were confirmed. The penalty sits toward the upper part of the band because the page has no primary Zentra source (high-priority coverage gap) and its status statements are about five weeks old.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-4,"score_limit":{"applied":-4,"limited":true,"proposed":-12,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}