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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#6
Score
40 → 40 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
457585310
Off-chain at
2026-10-16T09:20:49.809Z
Anchored at
2026-10-16T09:20:53.789Z
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
DXwqrCCzHNR7nPsxBHN7yqypnEnpqwZWxUCFdHg2yuuK
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2078 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"df1ba26ad5c966c37ea026b6733f8e7a","decided_at":"2026-10-16T09:20:49.580Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.2143,"findings_hash":"FWcfxJQT9wJvT28NvUDzaZwpG8tgdWVpVAEwXcunMbu5","investigation_id":"32a844a0-4b60-4c3c-9c8c-06ae37b7387e","mode":"findings_only","new_score":40,"page_content_hash":"d503a4f96de722b604936ddc938aaa2e53e4dce246771b7136e0bbd4132d89a0","page_slug":"dtrinity-dlend","prev_score":40,"reason":"The page's core narrative — two distinct, well-documented security incidents (a $56,000 Sept 2025 swap-adapter authorization exploit affecting only team funds, and a $257,000 March 2026 liquidity-index/empty-market exploit on the Ethereum cbBTC market) — is well supported by multiple independent technical write-ups (Verichains, DARKNAVY, BlockSec, Olympix, KuCoin/ChainCatcher) whose dates, amounts, and transaction hashes cross-check consistently. The five-audit history matches dTRINITY's own documentation precisely. Two weaknesses stand out: the January 2026 Ethereum launch date in the timeline is not actually supported by its cited source, which (as currently published) describes Ethereum support as forthcoming rather than confirming a live launch date, even though independent exploit reporting confirms an Ethereum deployment existed by March 2026; and several granular figures (exact dUSD peg price, Katana launch month, specific exploited function/contract names in the Sept 2025 incident) could not be independently verified due to source access restrictions (403s) or lack of corroborating detail elsewhere. No evidence contradicts the page's claims of no regulatory action and no fraud allegations. The biggest substantive gap is the absence of any independent confirmation that the committed March 2026 bad-debt repayment was actually completed, and of any analysis of governance/multisig centralization risk, which the page itself acknowledges as unverified.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":6,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}