Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Portal
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 57 → 57 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 464450456
- Off-chain at
- 2026-11-02T09:47:50.099Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-11-02T09:48:04.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-11-02T09:48:04.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 5YGk7DLGf7wEJwZSLBKjeuviFJG9Tq9GqTzGje1vGHVc
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1443 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"177c8ef46a42c977ecf1f4bd56c598cb","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-11-02T09:47:49.859Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0.2,"investigation_id":"e19d0cde-d8db-4eff-a8fc-ba46bed122c5","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":57,"page_slug":"portal","prev_score":57,"reason":"The advisor details and December 6, 2023 announcement date were confirmed (claim_findings[0], [4]). However, the CertiK-based holder concentration figures (claim_findings[1], [2]) are only partially supported because the cited CertiK page now shows 20,502 holders and a 45.12% major holding ratio, and the audit coverage figure (claim_findings[3]) could not be found on the cited page, so 1 of 5 checked claims (20%) is unverifiable and two more are only partially supported. These unsupported figures underpin the summary's risk framing, and a high-priority coverage gap on holder distribution remains open. The project appears to still be operating with no omitted shutdown or exploit, and the reviewer's confidence is low, so the penalty is kept modest and the page should be revised rather than denied.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":4,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}