Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 28 → 28 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443515745
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T18:03:43.400Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 4mybwfUNUdmBeajawoJNzYPZHdorcn555SGjG4qH7LMv
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1443 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-25T18:03:43.266Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"3758620e-d099-427e-aa60-da826e35cd86","new_score":28,"page_slug":"stablr-multisig-exploit-and-eurr-usdr-depeg","prev_score":28,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a 1-of-3 multisig key compromise leading to roughly $13.5M in unbacked minting, an ongoing MiCA 1:1 backing shortfall, a genuine but liquidity-driven secondary-market depeg (not a reserve loss), and a still-unresolved minting/redemption suspension — is directly corroborated by StablR's own official disclosures, EFRI's published analysis, and multiple independent security-firm and news reports fetched during this review, including matching wallet addresses and transaction hashes across three independent write-ups. The page correctly distinguishes an operational/governance compromise and market depeg from an actual loss of reserve assets. Minor imprecision was found in specific depeg trough figures, the exact final attacker-proceeds total (a cited source itself references a larger later figure), and the page's reliance on issuer self-report for reserve intactness without independent audit corroboration; no claim was found to be fabricated, contradicted by a more credible source, or superseded by resolution of the incident.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}