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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
0 → 0 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443515409
Off-chain at
2026-08-25T17:14:16.300Z
Anchored at
—
Block time
—

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
DjrBKyQU9kyvDuZ1N9iwJXyRttYtmGcw39owZuQ85kGr
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2421 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T17:14:15.925Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"6fbfea24-1ca0-4a70-93c0-6957bd54d09b","new_score":0,"page_slug":"263m-rico-social-engineering-crypto-theft-gang-dc-2024-2026-prosecutions","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative -- the RICO prosecution of the Social Engineering Enterprise, the August 2024 Washington D.C. theft, and the named defendants' individual roles, pleas, and sentences -- is well supported, with 17 of 25 claims fully confirmed against IRS-CI releases and independent reporting. Two claims are self-contradictory on the page's own terms: the timeline puts the total charged defendants at 17 as of May 2025 (claim_findings[19]), which cannot be reconciled with the page's own statement that three more defendants were charged in December 2025, and secondary sources put the May 2025 total at 13; and the Case Status section's 'eight other defendants entered guilty pleas' (claim_findings[20]) contradicts the page's own confirmed nine-plea total and its labeling of Mehta as 8th and Tangeman as 9th. The page also attaches DOJ's later $263 million case-aggregate figure to the single theft's value 'at the time of the theft' (claim_findings[9]), when contemporaneous court filings valued that same theft at $230 million -- a framing issue made more consequential because the figure is in the page's own title. Two of the four unverifiable findings (claim_findings[2], claim_findings[10]) echo this same defendant-count and valuation tension, while the remaining two (claim_findings[22], claim_findings[23]) are minor, plausible details the reviewer could not independently confirm, partly because the primary DOJ source was inaccessible throughout the review -- these do not indicate the page is wrong, only unconfirmed. Weighed in the page's favor, it avoids the three more serious defendant-exposure errors (a RICO statutory minimum misstated, defendants misdated into a cohort that predates their charges, and an unsupported claim that all nine pleading co-defendants received the same sentence range) found on AVOID's related malone-lam-crypto-syndicate page covering the same prosecution -- the category of error most capable of causing unfair reputational harm to named individuals.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}