Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 0 → 0 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443515409
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-25T17:14:16.300Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- DjrBKyQU9kyvDuZ1N9iwJXyRttYtmGcw39owZuQ85kGr
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2421 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-25T17:14:15.925Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"6fbfea24-1ca0-4a70-93c0-6957bd54d09b","new_score":0,"page_slug":"263m-rico-social-engineering-crypto-theft-gang-dc-2024-2026-prosecutions","prev_score":0,"reason":"The page's core narrative -- the RICO prosecution of the Social Engineering Enterprise, the August 2024 Washington D.C. theft, and the named defendants' individual roles, pleas, and sentences -- is well supported, with 17 of 25 claims fully confirmed against IRS-CI releases and independent reporting. Two claims are self-contradictory on the page's own terms: the timeline puts the total charged defendants at 17 as of May 2025 (claim_findings[19]), which cannot be reconciled with the page's own statement that three more defendants were charged in December 2025, and secondary sources put the May 2025 total at 13; and the Case Status section's 'eight other defendants entered guilty pleas' (claim_findings[20]) contradicts the page's own confirmed nine-plea total and its labeling of Mehta as 8th and Tangeman as 9th. The page also attaches DOJ's later $263 million case-aggregate figure to the single theft's value 'at the time of the theft' (claim_findings[9]), when contemporaneous court filings valued that same theft at $230 million -- a framing issue made more consequential because the figure is in the page's own title. Two of the four unverifiable findings (claim_findings[2], claim_findings[10]) echo this same defendant-count and valuation tension, while the remaining two (claim_findings[22], claim_findings[23]) are minor, plausible details the reviewer could not independently confirm, partly because the primary DOJ source was inaccessible throughout the review -- these do not indicate the page is wrong, only unconfirmed. Weighed in the page's favor, it avoids the three more serious defendant-exposure errors (a RICO statutory minimum misstated, defendants misdated into a cohort that predates their charges, and an unsupported claim that all nine pleading co-defendants received the same sentence range) found on AVOID's related malone-lam-crypto-syndicate page covering the same prosecution -- the category of error most capable of causing unfair reputational harm to named individuals.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}