Skip to main content
AVOID.NET
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#4
Score
0 → 0 (0)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
462367802
Off-chain at
2026-10-28T06:02:55.124Z
Anchored at
2026-10-28T06:03:10.000Z
Block time
2026-10-28T06:03:10.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
3uzH8thVt1GJDAoKCUHrp3s6bi8Lknb3oe23GMTvuYim
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2484 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"f822b18907f9aecd25fe0f59c645f201","blocked_count":3,"decided_at":"2026-10-28T06:02:54.920Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0,"findings_hash":"BrkTfu41NPEyRFNnDHGzqyUUSKiGxYNQVQZ71WfP1zjQ","investigation_id":"7f57b0c3-0efc-4c23-9c62-d2a0bb98ffd4","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"omissions":{"material":1,"total":2},"page_content_hash":"f4143f18bd45fe60b5580d805c73f5c7ab0277b9a2ec27fde36a52df0e8e2f74","page_slug":"openclaw-github-phishing","prev_score":0,"reason":"This page is unusually well-hedged and largely holds up under independent verification. The two core waves (January 2026 CLAWD account-hijack token pump-and-dump, and the March 2026 OX Security-disclosed CLAW-token GitHub phishing/wallet-drainer) are corroborated by multiple independent, live-fetched outlets, and several highly specific details (the GitHub issue #49836 filing date and content, the joylarkin tracker's exact latest entry date, the lure quote text, Steinberger's quotes) were confirmed verbatim or near-verbatim against primary or independent sources. The page's practice of explicitly flagging cross-source date disagreements (March 11/18 vs March 12/19) reflects genuine ambiguity in the underlying reporting rather than carelessness. The main weaknesses found: the Hacker News victim-report count is overstated against the page's own cited thread (nine reporters, not 'more than ten'; one noting new account age, not 'several'); a Lex Fridman quote about harassers' technical skill is attributed without the actual source (the podcast) appearing anywhere in the citation list; several granular technical figures (wallet/RPC enumeration counts, the Bustan quote) rest entirely on the OX Security blog, which is blocked to automated access and could not be independently checked; and two timeline entries use bare-year dates where month-level precision is readily available. The page also does not mention a contemporaneous but mechanically distinct OpenClaw-branded supply-chain trojan campaign (the 'OpenClaw Deployer' repo), which is a material omission for readers assessing ongoing developer risk from OpenClaw-branded threats.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":19,"sequence_num":4,"subject_status":"shut_down","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}