Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · OpenClaw GitHub Phishing Campaign
- Sequence
- #4
- Score
- 0 → 0 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462367802
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-28T06:02:55.124Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-28T06:03:10.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-28T06:03:10.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 3uzH8thVt1GJDAoKCUHrp3s6bi8Lknb3oe23GMTvuYim
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2484 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"f822b18907f9aecd25fe0f59c645f201","blocked_count":3,"decided_at":"2026-10-28T06:02:54.920Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0,"findings_hash":"BrkTfu41NPEyRFNnDHGzqyUUSKiGxYNQVQZ71WfP1zjQ","investigation_id":"7f57b0c3-0efc-4c23-9c62-d2a0bb98ffd4","mode":"findings_only","new_score":0,"omissions":{"material":1,"total":2},"page_content_hash":"f4143f18bd45fe60b5580d805c73f5c7ab0277b9a2ec27fde36a52df0e8e2f74","page_slug":"openclaw-github-phishing","prev_score":0,"reason":"This page is unusually well-hedged and largely holds up under independent verification. The two core waves (January 2026 CLAWD account-hijack token pump-and-dump, and the March 2026 OX Security-disclosed CLAW-token GitHub phishing/wallet-drainer) are corroborated by multiple independent, live-fetched outlets, and several highly specific details (the GitHub issue #49836 filing date and content, the joylarkin tracker's exact latest entry date, the lure quote text, Steinberger's quotes) were confirmed verbatim or near-verbatim against primary or independent sources. The page's practice of explicitly flagging cross-source date disagreements (March 11/18 vs March 12/19) reflects genuine ambiguity in the underlying reporting rather than carelessness. The main weaknesses found: the Hacker News victim-report count is overstated against the page's own cited thread (nine reporters, not 'more than ten'; one noting new account age, not 'several'); a Lex Fridman quote about harassers' technical skill is attributed without the actual source (the podcast) appearing anywhere in the citation list; several granular technical figures (wallet/RPC enumeration counts, the Bustan quote) rest entirely on the OX Security blog, which is blocked to automated access and could not be independently checked; and two timeline entries use bare-year dates where month-level precision is readily available. The page also does not mention a contemporaneous but mechanically distinct OpenClaw-branded supply-chain trojan campaign (the 'OpenClaw Deployer' repo), which is a material omission for readers assessing ongoing developer risk from OpenClaw-branded threats.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":0,"scored_claims":19,"sequence_num":4,"subject_status":"shut_down","subject_status_contradicts_page":false,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}