Skip to main content
Sign in
← avoid.net

Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Decision
review_revise · Ledger Live
View on Solana ↗
Sequence
#3
Score
5850 (-8)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
443524596
Off-chain at
2026-08-27T07:08:32.421Z
Anchored at
Block time

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
BeYebkurxazghAdyhYGFom2uVGC6EcPBr2FTQ5owBNbB
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2080 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T07:08:32.109Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"35de6192-9b0a-4914-8df7-3dbc6b531713","new_score":50,"page_slug":"ledger-live","prev_score":58,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 16 of 20 factual claims outright, and the page's core incidents — the November 2023 Microsoft Store fake app, the April 2026 Apple App Store fake app, and the December 2023 Connect Kit supply-chain attack — are well corroborated against primary sources, including Ledger's own incident report (claim_findings[3], [5], [6], [9]). The reviewer also independently checked the page's decision to defer coverage of the 2020 data breach and litigation history to a separate 'Ledger' entity page, and confirmed that page genuinely and accurately covers that material (claim_findings[4]) — a scoping choice that holds up rather than one that dodges scrutiny. That said, two things keep this from a clean pass. First, the page's own summary says counterfeit-app theft reached 'tens of millions of dollars,' but its own itemized incidents add up to about $10.3 million — an overstatement of the page's own evidence, correctly flagged as disputed (claim_findings[2]). Second, the page asserts the genuine app 'has no documented vulnerabilities that have led to direct fund loss,' but a real Ledger Ethereum-app signing flaw was disclosed in August 2026, just before this review, and the page has not been updated to reflect it; the reviewer classified this as stale rather than disputed since the claim was accurate when written, but flagged it as a high-priority coverage gap given it undercuts the page's central safety assertion. The disputed-claim rate on its own is only 5%, comfortably within the approval range, but a high-priority gap touching a core claim is treated here as grounds for revision rather than approval, consistent with the instruction that such gaps can outweigh a low headline disputed rate.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}