Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · Ledger Live
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 58 → 50 (-8)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443524596
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-27T07:08:32.421Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- BeYebkurxazghAdyhYGFom2uVGC6EcPBr2FTQ5owBNbB
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2080 chars)
{"actor":"judge","decided_at":"2026-08-27T07:08:32.109Z","decision":"review_revise","investigation_id":"35de6192-9b0a-4914-8df7-3dbc6b531713","new_score":50,"page_slug":"ledger-live","prev_score":58,"reason":"The reviewer confirmed 16 of 20 factual claims outright, and the page's core incidents — the November 2023 Microsoft Store fake app, the April 2026 Apple App Store fake app, and the December 2023 Connect Kit supply-chain attack — are well corroborated against primary sources, including Ledger's own incident report (claim_findings[3], [5], [6], [9]). The reviewer also independently checked the page's decision to defer coverage of the 2020 data breach and litigation history to a separate 'Ledger' entity page, and confirmed that page genuinely and accurately covers that material (claim_findings[4]) — a scoping choice that holds up rather than one that dodges scrutiny. That said, two things keep this from a clean pass. First, the page's own summary says counterfeit-app theft reached 'tens of millions of dollars,' but its own itemized incidents add up to about $10.3 million — an overstatement of the page's own evidence, correctly flagged as disputed (claim_findings[2]). Second, the page asserts the genuine app 'has no documented vulnerabilities that have led to direct fund loss,' but a real Ledger Ethereum-app signing flaw was disclosed in August 2026, just before this review, and the page has not been updated to reflect it; the reviewer classified this as stale rather than disputed since the claim was accurate when written, but flagged it as a high-priority coverage gap given it undercuts the page's central safety assertion. The disputed-claim rate on its own is only 5%, comfortably within the approval range, but a high-priority gap touching a core claim is treated here as grounds for revision rather than approval, consistent with the instruction that such gaps can outweigh a low headline disputed rate.","score_delta":-8,"sequence_num":3,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}