Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · Raft Protocol
- Sequence
- #5
- Score
- 47 → 47 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 457456838
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-16T01:38:16.787Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-16T01:38:44.270Z
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- CpKQUeXVeXeVxQp6oqcTN1nBsPVdcRjwkzVe1KHr28CW
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1673 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","artifact_identity":"e74cbebcac28284e8966ef7397a0e3d9","decided_at":"2026-10-16T01:38:16.612Z","decision":"review","disputed_pct":0.32,"findings_hash":"8PMAmwbutT31QjjEDPSYoVXChRH2tuqfLUCrngy6oHn1","investigation_id":"4ca64fe1-1c2b-442d-84e9-ddd98e3729f2","mode":"findings_only","new_score":47,"page_content_hash":"f0f855506d3bde4f4a7026e4912ae03dd8f1835543f6e894a9300ec337849e95","page_slug":"raft-protocol","prev_score":47,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a flash-loan-enabled precision rounding exploit on Raft's divUp share-minting function, the attacker's own script accidentally burning 1,570 of 1,577 stolen ETH, the resulting R depeg, and the multi-firm audit failure — is well supported by tier-1 and tier-2 sources (CoinDesk, Cointelegraph, directly-fetched technical write-ups). However, the page contains a genuine arithmetic inconsistency in its own stated 7-ETH/net-loss accounting that contradicts its own cited CoinDesk source's clearer 18-before/14-after framing, a likely two-day error in the post-mortem publication date (Nov 11 vs the more widely reported Nov 13), an overstated depeg low point in one section that conflicts with its own cited source, and a load-bearing 42% recovery-rate/Aerodrome-LP claim resting entirely on a single dead link with no corroboration anywhere else. Several cited URLs (forum.raft.fi, a Blockworks article, ImmuneBytes live link, Crypto Times live link) are dead; some have working archive.org fallbacks already recorded in sources_used, others do not.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":5,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}