Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review · BONK.fun
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 42 → 42 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443508736
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-18T20:40:47.494Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- Ccj3pRWTNtx78UMW1AXQb5NZpBfCz9ziW5mvYJSWNVLw
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1329 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-18T20:40:47.420Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"4e806f2b-5b8e-47a3-b0ec-336c97b71675","new_score":42,"page_slug":"bonk-fun","prev_score":42,"reason":"The page's core narrative — a Web2 domain-registrar social-engineering attack (not a protocol or smart-contract exploit), ~$30,000 in confirmed losses, a registrar acknowledgment of fault, and a prompt relaunch with a 110% refund commitment — is well corroborated by multiple independent tier-1/tier-2 outlets. The page is unusually careful about hedging the disputed $273,000 individual-victim figure, correctly flagging it as unverified on-chain, which matches independent reporting almost exactly. The main defect found is a citation mismatch in the market-share history: the timeline entry for 2025-09-01 describes Pump.fun regaining ~81% share using a source that actually documents the opposite (LetsBonk gaining share in early August 2025), and there is a minor internal inconsistency between the 82% and 84% peak market-share figures in two different sections. Neither issue affects the incident-severity narrative, which is the substantive basis for the entity's risk profile.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}