Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
review_revise · NEAR Intents Omni Exploit (October 2026)
- Sequence
- #3
- Score
- 28 → 26 (-2)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 462279515
- Off-chain at
- 2026-10-28T00:48:46.557Z
- Anchored at
- 2026-10-28T00:49:55.000Z
- Block time
- 2026-10-28T00:49:55.000Z
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- 7YHeT1uWrdKec9DrQtpmFUdFUscLzEdnjK2hMKb2UML2
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2234 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"3247fe93ae411930fb7583e2ff50b430","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-28T00:48:46.247Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"80319ae0-ff55-4387-b566-3306a009cfb4","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":26,"page_slug":"near-intents-omni-exploit-october-2026","prev_score":28,"reason":"The incident facts as of October 1-2 (the $3.8M loss, the 11-network pause, ZachXBT's tracing and the Bitget context) match Tier 2 reporting (claim_findings[0], [4], [8]). The page is now out of date. A later post-mortem reportedly places the flaw in the NEAR Intents contract's deposit notification function, not in the Omni infrastructure, and says the page's statement that no post-mortem exists is no longer true (claim_findings[1], [2]). The same post-mortem reportedly says the attacker returned the funds and users were compensated, which the page does not mention (omission_findings[0], [1], subject_status). The 12-hour restoration claim rests on a forecast (claim_findings[3]). The reviewer relied on secondary coverage of the post-mortem and reported moderate confidence, so the penalty sits in the lower half of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-2,"score_limit":{"applied":-2,"limited":true,"proposed":-18,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"sequence_num":3,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"approve","reason":"Counting only disputed or unverifiable findings gives 0% (0 of 10), and counting the two stale findings as disputed gives 20%. Both understate the problem. The review reports three material omissions and subject_status.contradicts_page is true: an October 16 post-mortem gives a different root cause, says the attacker returned the funds and says users were compensated, and the page presents none of this. The two stale findings (claim_findings[1], [2]) also fall on the page's core cause section. The band is raised to significant."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}