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AVOID.NET
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Verify a decision

Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.

How verification works

  1. We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction.
  2. We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
  3. You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>

Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.

Sequence
#3
Score
28 → 26 (-2)
Cluster
mainnet-beta
Slot
462279515
Off-chain at
2026-10-28T00:48:46.557Z
Anchored at
2026-10-28T00:49:55.000Z
Block time
2026-10-28T00:49:55.000Z

Independent verification

1. Database (off-chain)
7YHeT1uWrdKec9DrQtpmFUdFUscLzEdnjK2hMKb2UML2
2. Recomputed (your browser)
computing…
3. On-chain (Solana memo)
fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (2234 chars)
{"actor":"judge","artifact_identity":"3247fe93ae411930fb7583e2ff50b430","band_override":null,"decided_at":"2026-10-28T00:48:46.247Z","decision":"review_revise","delist_requested":false,"disputed_pct":0,"investigation_id":"80319ae0-ff55-4387-b566-3306a009cfb4","judge_def_hash":"8800307026131ea9d5da939d32b9a1f1884b2b84a5de33c8e87931d36f38d0f8","new_score":26,"page_slug":"near-intents-omni-exploit-october-2026","prev_score":28,"reason":"The incident facts as of October 1-2 (the $3.8M loss, the 11-network pause, ZachXBT's tracing and the Bitget context) match Tier 2 reporting (claim_findings[0], [4], [8]). The page is now out of date. A later post-mortem reportedly places the flaw in the NEAR Intents contract's deposit notification function, not in the Omni infrastructure, and says the page's statement that no post-mortem exists is no longer true (claim_findings[1], [2]). The same post-mortem reportedly says the attacker returned the funds and users were compensated, which the page does not mention (omission_findings[0], [1], subject_status). The 12-hour restoration claim rests on a forecast (claim_findings[3]). The reviewer relied on secondary coverage of the post-mortem and reported moderate confidence, so the penalty sits in the lower half of the band.","reviewer_def_hash":"bc11388ce4bc4deea1b064fea362663ae06e3f4f687f99604769044d6ffba770","score_delta":-2,"score_limit":{"applied":-2,"limited":true,"proposed":-18,"rule":"limited_no_second_opinion","second":null},"sequence_num":3,"severity_override":{"applied":true,"band":"significant","from_band":"approve","reason":"Counting only disputed or unverifiable findings gives 0% (0 of 10), and counting the two stale findings as disputed gives 20%. Both understate the problem. The review reports three material omissions and subject_status.contradicts_page is true: an October 16 post-mortem gives a different root cause, says the attacker returned the funds and says users were compensated, and the page presents none of this. The two stale findings (claim_findings[1], [2]) also fall on the page's core cause section. The band is raised to significant."},"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}