Verify a decision
Every moderation decision on AVOID.NET is anchored to the Solana blockchain. You don't have to trust us — you can verify cryptographically that we committed to a verdict at a specific moment and have not rewritten it.
How verification works
- We commit. When a moderator accepts/rejects a submission, we serialize the decision into deterministic UTF-8 bytes (
payload_canonical_string), hash it with SHA-256, encode the digest as base58, and write it to Solana inside an SPL Memo v2 transaction. - We store the bytes. The exact bytes we hashed are stored alongside the decision in our database. Anyone can read them and recompute the hash in any language.
- You compare three values. Database hash, your independently-recomputed hash, and the hash inside the on-chain memo. If all three match, the decision is authentic and timestamped.
The on-chain memo format is
AVOID.NET|v1|h:<b58-sha256>|d:<id>|t:<iso>Find a signature on any investigation page's decision log, or run python -m src.verify_decision --signature <sig> for a CLI check.
Decision
- Sequence
- #2
- Score
- 2 → 2 (0)
- Cluster
- mainnet-beta
- Slot
- 443521848
- Off-chain at
- 2026-08-26T18:05:35.449Z
- Anchored at
- —
- Block time
- —
Independent verification
- 1. Database (off-chain)
- ELx4Ge5q1AfQCVjqvL7Qf8J5mWiQhespkFgWbWiry8bt
- 2. Recomputed (your browser)
- computing…
- 3. On-chain (Solana memo)
- fetching…
Canonical bytes hashed (1617 chars)
{"actor":"reviewer","decided_at":"2026-08-26T18:05:35.143Z","decision":"review","investigation_id":"af4d060c-46bf-4ace-a1b7-8ae8370b39fd","new_score":2,"page_slug":"wojtek-kulisz-aka-merry-sim-swap-gang","prev_score":2,"reason":"The core, checkable facts of the arrest -- date, agencies (CBZC/FBI/HSI), Krakow Regional Prosecutor's Office oversight, three charge categories, pretrial detention, and 25-year maximum sentence -- are well supported by credible reporting and consistent with the underlying CBZC statement. The page correctly and repeatedly flags that Polish authorities have never officially confirmed Wojtek Kulisz's identity as one of the four detainees, and no official Polish source (CBZC, prosecutor, or court) names him. However, the page has three notable defects: a summary sentence that undercuts its own hedge by asserting as fact that Kulisz specifically 'has been placed in pretrial detention'; an unsupported characterization of 'Merry' as having 'a prior history of targeting cryptocurrency users and exchanges' that goes beyond what any source (including the page's own hedge two sentences later) establishes; and a mischaracterized analogy to Europol's SIMCARTEL operation, which addressed a different fraud technique. A parallel AVOID.NET page on the same case uses more cautious language on both the financial figure and the prior-history question, creating a consistency gap between two live pages about the same unconvicted, named individual.","score_delta":0,"sequence_num":2,"submission_content_hash":null,"submission_id":null,"submission_kind":null,"submission_valence":null,"v":1}